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The	largest	and	most	influential	player	in	the	industry,	SLM	
Corporation,	better	known	as	Sallie	Mae,	hasn’t	escaped	
the	controversy:	In	the	wake	of	Cuomo’s	investigation,	
the	company	agreed	under	the	terms	of	a	settlement	
with	the	New	York	prosecutor	to	abide	by	a	new	“code	
of	conduct”	and	to	put	$2	million	into	a	fund	to	educate	
students	about	financial	aid.	Yet	days	after	the	Sallie	Mae	
settlement,	the	publicly	traded	company	announced	that	it	
was	being	sold	to	private	investors	for	$25	billion—a	sum	
that	suggests	the	enormity	of	the	financial	stakes	in	the	
student	loan	industry.
The	story	of	Sallie	Mae’s	rise	from	a	government-
sponsored	agency	created	to	help	needy	students	to	a	
private	corporation	with	a	$142	billion	loan	portfolio	goes	
a	long	way	toward	explaining	how	and	why	the	student	
loan	industry	has	landed	at	the	center	of	controversy.
Created	by	Congress	in	1972	to	increase	the	supply	
of	lendable	funds	under	the	then-decade-old	federal	
student	loan	program,	Sallie	Mae	for	many	years	played	
a	relatively	narrow	role	in	the	industry	as	a	“secondary	
lender,”	buying	and	managing	loans	from	banks	and	other	
lenders	that	used	their	proceeds	from	Sallie	Mae	to	make	
new	loans.
But	in	the	mid-1990s,	skyrocketing	demand	for	
student	loans	prompted	by	escalating	college	tuitions,	
expanding	eligibility	for	student	loans,	and	a	host	of	
new	types	of	lending	combined	to	make	the	student	
loan	industry	infinitely	more	complex,	larger,	and	more	
lucrative.	And	Sallie	Mae	emerged	as	the	industry’s	
biggest	player.
After	shedding	its	government-sponsored	status	and	
becoming	a	fully	private,	for-profit	corporation,	Sallie	
Mae	embarked	on	an	aggressive	expansion	campaign.	It	
bought,	or	formed	partnerships	with,	companies	working	
in	every	corner	of	the	student	lending	industry,	from	
lending	and	loan	collection	to	enrollment	management	
and	even	college-tuition	savings	plans	for	infants.
Sallie	Mae	has	helped	millions	of	students	pay	for	college,	
students	who	would	not	have	otherwise	been	able	to	
cover	the	cost.	But	the	relentless	expansion	of	Sallie	Mae	
and	other	lending	giants	into	every	part	of	the	student-aid	
enterprise	and	into	every	region	of	the	country	combined	
with	an	outmatched	and	often	unmotivated	federal	
regulatory	bureaucracy,	industry	political	clout	that	reaches	
from	the	halls	of	Congress	to	college	campuses,	and	
lucrative	regulatory	loopholes	that	contribute	to	student	
lending’s	immense	profit	potential	have	created	a	climate	
that’s	ripe	for	the	questionable	marketing	tactics	and	other	
industry	wrongdoing	that	have	emerged	in	recent	months.
It	is	a	climate	that	has	empowered	the	lending	industry	
to	act	aggressively	at	every	turn,	placing	students	at	risk	
of	paying	inflated	interest	rates	and	fees	on	their	federal	
loans	and	leaving	taxpayers	to	pick	up	the	tab	for	what	
members	of	Congress	say	are	hundreds	of	millions	of	
dollars	in	excessive	subsidies	for	the	student	lending	
industry.
As	the	Sallie	Mae	story	suggests,	past	is	prologue	in	the	
student	lending	industry.	Today’s	problems	are	the	result	
of	conditions	in	the	industry	that	have	been	building	for	
years.
The $85-billion-a-year student loan industry has been beset by scandal 
since new york attorney general andrew Cuomo announced on March 
15, 2007, that his office was investigating “unholy alliances” between 
lending companies and college financial aid officers. Revelations of college 
officials accepting consulting fees from and holding stock in companies 
on their school’s preferred-lender lists, lenders staffing college’s financial 
information call centers, and close ties between U.S. Department of 
Education officials and lenders have been front-page news.
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Opening College Doors
The	size,	complexity,	and	immense	profit	potential	
of	today’s	student	loan	industry	isn’t	what	Congress	
envisioned	when	it	created	the	Guaranteed	Student	Loan	
Program	(renamed	the	Federal	Family	Education	Loan	
Program	in	1992)	as	part	of	the	Higher	Education	Act	
(HEA)	of	1965.	The	program	began	as	a	relatively	small,	
targeted	effort	to	open	college	doors	for	financially	needy	
students.	The	original	program	provided	loans	of	up	to	
$1,000	per	year	to	undergraduate	students	and	$1,500	a	
year	to	graduate	students	with	family	incomes	of	less	than	
$15,000	(see	sidebar	on	federal	student	loans,	page	7).1
Since	the	students	in	the	program	were,	by	design,	
higher-risk	borrowers,	the	federal	government	created	
incentives	for	lenders	to	participate	in	the	new	federal	
initiative.	It	gave	states	funds	to	establish	“guarantee	
agencies,”	which	would	insure	lenders	against	losses	from	
defaulted	loans,	thereby	reducing	lenders’	risk.	The	feds	
also	guaranteed	lenders	a	6	percent	interest	rate	on	their	
student	loans—at	the	time,	a	rate	slightly	higher	than	rates	
for	more	secure	home	mortgage	loans.
These	incentives	were	insufficient	to	encourage	states	
to	take	on	the	risk	of	establishing	guarantee	agencies	
without	some	federal	insurance	on	loans,	and	the	6	
percent	interest	rate	was	not	high	enough	to	attract	
private	lenders.	In	response,	the	federal	government	
pursued	two	strategies	to	boost	participation	by	banks	
and	states:	shifting	the	risk	to	the	federal	government	and	
increasing	banks’	profits	on	loans.
Congress	in	1968	authorized	the	U.S.	Department	of	
Education	(then	called	the	Office	of	Education)	to	pay	
state	guarantee	agencies	80	percent	of	the	amount	
of	their	losses.	The	year	before,	the	Department	of	
Education	had	established	the	Federal	Insured	Student	
Loan	program	to	reimburse	lenders	in	states	without	
guarantee	agencies.	Under	that	program,	the	federal	
government	reimbursed	lenders	100	percent	of	their	
defaulted	loans.
To	increase	profits	to	banks,	Congress	quickly	raised	the	
guaranteed	interest	rate	on	student	loans	to	7	percent.2	
But	by	mid-1969,	interest	rates	charged	to	the	most	
credit-worthy	borrowers	were	8.5	percent,	making	the	
7	percent	interest	rate	on	more	risky	student	loans	
unappealing	to	banks.	In	response,	Congress	established	
in	1969	subsidies	known	as	“Special	Allowance	
Payments”	to	ensure	lenders	received	market-rate	profits	
on	loans	(see	sidebar	on	special	allowance	payments,	
page	12).	Special	allowance	payments	were	tied	to	
Student lending glossary
Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE):	a	for-profit,	
privately	operated	corporation	chartered	by	the	government	to	
increase	investments	in	a	specific	sector	of	the	economy.
Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP):	a	federal	
student	loan	program	authorized	in	the	Higher	Education	
Act.	Loans	are	provided	by	private	lenders	and	insured	by	
the	federal	government.	Loan	programs	include	Stafford	
Subsidized	and	Unsubsidized	loans,	and	PLUS	loans.
Federal Direct Loan Program (FDLP):	a	federal	student	loan	
program	authorized	in	the	1992	reauthorization	of	the	Higher	
Education	Act.	Loans	are	provided	by	the	Department	of	
Education	directly	to	students	through	their	schools,	without	
private	lenders	or	guarantee	agencies.
Guarantee Agency:	organization	in	the	Federal	Family	Education	
Loan	Program	that	insures	lenders	against	financial	losses	due	
to	loan	defaults.	Guarantee	agencies	are	also	responsible	for	
helping	to	administer	the	program	and	oversee	lenders.
Default:	Default	occurs	when	a	borrower	fails	to	make	the	
required	monthly	payments	on	his	or	her	loan.	In	the	Federal	
Family	Education	Loan	Program	and	the	Federal	Direct	Loan	
Program,	a	borrower	is	in	default	after	270	days	of	non-
payment,	assuming	no	alternative	arrangements	for	payment	
were	made	with	the	lender.
Loan Servicing:	activities	performed	to	collect	and	process	
loan	payments	during	the	life	of	a	loan.	These	include	
contacting	and	communicating	with	borrowers,	collecting	
payments,	filing	paperwork	with	the	Department	of	Education,	
and	providing	collection	efforts	on	delinquent	loans.
Collection Agency:	agency	hired	by	a	lender	or	guarantee	
agency	to	locate	defaulted	borrowers	and	recover	payments	
on	defaulted	loans.
Loan Consolidation:	combining	one	or	more	loans	into	
one	loan	with	a	single	lender.	Loan	consolidation	can	allow	
borrowers	to	make	one	monthly	loan	payment,	extend	the	
payment	period	on	their	loans	(thereby	reducing	monthly	
payments)	and	lock-in	interest	rates.
Secondary Market:	an	organization	that	buys	existing	
loans	from	a	bank	or	other	lender.	Lenders	sell	loans	to	the	
secondary	market	in	order	to	raise	money	to	make	new	loans.	
Enrollment Management:	the	process	of	using	past	
enrollment	and	financial	aid	data	from	a	school	to	predict	
which	students	are	likely	to	apply	and	enroll.	Enrollment	
management	often	includes	leveraging	financial	aid	awards	to	
recruit	a	desirable	class	of	students.	
529 Savings Plans:	state-sponsored	investment	options	run	
by	private	investment	groups	and	named	after	Section	529	
of	the	tax	code.	In	2001,	Congress	exempted	these	savings	
plans,	which	can	be	used	for	higher	education	expenses,	from	
federal	income	tax.
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changing	interest	rates	and	paid	lenders	as	much	as	3	
percentage	points	above	the	7	percent	interest	charged	
to	students.	With	special	allowance	payments,	the	federal	
subsidies	rose	along	with	interest	rates,	ensuring	profits	
for	banks	regardless	of	interest	rate	changes.
As	a	result,	lenders’	guaranteed	interest	earnings	on	
student	loans	jumped	from	6	percent	to	9	percent	in	1969,	
while	the	associated	risk	dropped	to	nearly	zero,	making	
student	lending	a	very	attractive	business.3
Still,	the	federal	lending	program	was	relatively	simple	in	
the	1960s.	It	involved	lenders,	the	federal	government,	
which	provided	subsidies	and	loan	insurance	to	banks	
and	state	guarantee	agencies,	and	colleges	and	students	
(see	Figure	1).
Increasing Cash Flow
But	Congress	soon	expanded	its	efforts	to	encourage	
lending	to	students	by	making	sure	banks	had	ample	
lendable	cash.	In	1972,	it	created	the	Student	Loan	
Marketing	Association	(SLMA),	as	Sallie	Mae	was	
originally	called,	to	provide	a	“secondary	market”	for	
student	loans.	The	new	company	bought	student	loans	
from	banks	to	free	up	lender	money	for	new	loans.
Congress	created	Sallie	Mae	as	a	Government	Sponsored	
Enterprise	(GSE)—a	for-profit,	privately	operated	
corporation	chartered	by	the	government	to	increase	
investments	in	a	specific	sector	of	the	economy.	Other	
well-known	GSEs	include	“Fannie	Mae,”	for	the	housing	
industry,	and	“Farmer	Mac,”	for	the	farming	industry.	
Sallie	Mae	received	valuable	benefits	as	a	GSE,	including	
exemption	from	state	and	local	taxes,	and	access	to	
low-cost	funds	from	the	U.S.	Department	of	the	Treasury.	
Sallie	Mae	paid	only	a	fraction	of	a	percent	in	interest	on	
the	funds	it	borrowed	from	the	U.S.	Treasury.	Sallie	Mae’s	
earnings—from	interest	payments	made	by	students	and	
subsidies	paid	by	the	federal	government	on	student	
loans—were	also	tied	to	Treasury	bill	rates.	Therefore,	
if	interest	rates	went	up	Sallie	Mae	paid	more	to	the	
Treasury	for	its	funds,	but	got	even	more	back	in	subsidies	
from	the	federal	government,	giving	Sallie	Mae	an	easy	
path	to	profits.
Congress	further	sweetened	the	pot	for	states	and	
lenders	with	the	Tax	Reform	Act	of	1976.	This	act	
authorized	state	agencies	to	issue	tax-exempt	bonds	
to	purchase	student	loans	in	the	secondary	market.	
States	quickly	took	advantage	of	this	opportunity,	which	
allowed	them	to	use	low-cost,	tax-exempt	money	to	buy	
loans	while	reaping	in	high	federal	interest	subsidies	on	
those	loans.	States	established	nonprofit	corporations	to	
act	as	secondary	markets	and	purchase	student	loans	
from	banks.	Having	both	state	secondary	markets	and	
Sallie	Mae	further	ensured	that	there	would	be	enough	
money	available	for	banks	to	keep	making	loans,	and	
it	gave	banks	security,	knowing	they	could	sell	their	
loans	if	needed.	Congress	also	increased	the	federal	
“reinsurance”	on	defaulted	student	loans	to	100	percent	
for	state	guarantee	agencies.	With	the	risk	to	state	
governments	largely	eliminated,	the	number	of	state	
guarantee	agencies,	which	never	exceeded	26	before	
1976,	grew	to	50	by	1981.4
With	the	addition	of	Sallie	Mae	and	other	secondary	
markets,	the	federal	loan	program	became	more	complex	
and	more	costly	for	taxpayers.	The	federal	government	
was	now	guaranteeing	all	loans	at	100	percent,	and	
paying	banks,	Sallie	Mae,	and	state	secondary	markets	
high	interest	subsidies	on	loans.	In	1979,	Alfred	B.	
Fitt,	the	general	counsel	in	the	newly	established	
Congressional	Budget	Office	stated,	“the	[federal	loan]	
program	has	gone	through	piecemeal	alterations	that	
have	transformed	it	into	a	system	much	more	costly	than	
a	direct	federal	loan	program,	with	the	higher	costs	not	
redounding	to	the	benefit	of	student	borrowers,	but	rather	
to	the	benefit	of	the	financial	institutions	that	make	the	
loans”	(see	Figure	2).5
Figure 1. Federal Student loan Program, circa 965
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Selling Stock
Loosened	loan	eligibility	requirements,	together	with	two	
new	federal	loan	programs,	increased	student	borrowing	
from	$1.8	billion	in	1977	to	$12	billion	in	1989.6	The	1978	
Middle	Income	Student	Assistance	Act	eliminated	income	
restrictions	and	expanded	federal	loan	eligibility	to	all	
students	(In	1981,	the	Reagan	administration	re-instated	
financial	need	as	a	requirement	for	receiving	subsidized	
student	loans);	the	Auxiliary	Loan	to	Assist	Students	
program	(ALAS),	approved	by	Congress	in	1981,	extended	
eligibility	to	students	with	no	parental	financial	support;	
and	Congress	created	the	Parent	Loan	for	Undergraduate	
Students	program	(PLUS)	in	1980,	to	allow	parents	to	
take	out	supplemental	loans	to	help	cover	their	children’s	
college	costs.
During	the	same	period,	Congress	expanded	Sallie	Mae’s	
role	in	the	lending	industry.	In	the	1980	reauthorization	
of	HEA,	Congress	authorized	Sallie	Mae	to	offer	“loan	
consolidation”	to	students	with	significant	debt,	permitting	
them	to	combine	multiple	federal	loans	into	single	
loans	with	longer	repayment	terms	and	lower	monthly	
payments.	Lawmakers	also	granted	Sallie	Mae	permission	
both	to	make	loans	directly	to	students	in	areas	of	the	
country	where	students	could	not	get	loans	from	another	
lender	and	to	act	as	a	guarantor	in	states	where	demand	
for	loans	outpaced	supply.7
These	changes,	along	with	the	new	loan	programs	and	
resulting	boom	in	loan	volume,	meant	rising	profits	for	
Sallie	Mae	and	other	lenders.	Sallie	Mae’s	assets	grew	
from	$1.6	billion	in	1979	to	$28.6	billion	in	1988.	In	
between,	the	company	issued	its	first	public	stock	offering	
in	1983,	raising	$357	million	in	private	capital.8	With	the	
influx	of	private	capital,	Sallie	Mae	was	no	longer	reliant	
only	on	federal	funds	for	expansion.
Rising	lender	profits	meant	higher	administrative	costs	for	
the	federal	government.	The	price	tag	of	the	federal	loan	
program,	including	loan	subsidies	to	students	and	banks	
and	federal	payments	for	defaulted	loans,	grew	from	$2.7	
billion	in	1981	to	$4.1	billion	in	1985.9	In	1986,	payments	
to	lenders	for	defaulted	loans	alone	cost	the	federal	
government	over	$1	billion.
In	an	effort	to	reduce	high	default	rates,	the	U.S.	
Department	of	Education	imposed	new	due-diligence	
requirements	on	the	student	lending	industry	when	it	
reauthorized	the	Higher	Education	Act	in	1986.	The	
requirements	dictated	that	lenders	and	guarantee	
agencies	follow	exacting	procedures	in	making	loans,	
processing	payments,	and	collecting	on	defaulted	
loans—and	risk	losing	reimbursements	on	defaulted	
loans	if	they	failed	to	follow	them.	Inadvertently,	
the	department’s	new	regulations	helped	fuel	the	
development	of	lending-industry	giants	like	Sallie	Mae	
by	creating	barriers	to	entry	to	smaller,	newer	companies	
wanting	to	enter	the	field.
Existing	lenders,	which	were	often	state	or	regional	banks,	
saw	the	new	regulatory	requirements	as	a	threat	to	their	
bottom	lines.	To	protect	themselves,	they	began	selling	
their	loans	to	large	lenders,	or	outsourcing	loan	servicing	
(processing	payments	and	paperwork)	and	collection	
(locating	and	contacting	defaulted	borrowers).	As	a	result,	
both	lending	and	loan	servicing	became	concentrated	
in	fewer	and	fewer	companies.10	The	number	of	active	
lenders	in	the	federal	loan	program	has	dropped	from	a	
high	of	11,298	in	1985	to	3,166	in	2007	(see	Figure	3).
The	outsourcing	of	loan	servicing	and	collecting	and	
the	expansion	of	loan	consolidation,	which	Congress	
originally	only	offered	to	Sallie	Mae	but	soon	extended	
Figure 2. Federal Student loan Program, circa 976
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to	other	companies,	created	an	even	more	complicated	
student	lending	system	(see	Figure	4).
Warning Signs
The	1990s	saw	more	increases	in	both	student	lending	
volume	(from	$14	billion	in	1991	to	$30	billion	in	1996)	
and	industry	profits.	Rising	tuitions	and	the	1992	
reauthorization	of	the	Higher	Education	Act,	which	
increased	federal	loan	limits	and	introduced	unsubsidized	
loans	(loans	for	which	the	government	did	not	pay	the	
interest	while	students	were	still	in	college)	to	students	at	
all	income	levels,11	fueled	demand	for	student	loans.
But	this	latest	expansion	of	the	student	loan	industry	
was	accompanied	by	early	signs	of	abuses	and	a	lack	
of	government	oversight,	much	like	the	stories	making	
headlines	today.	Hearings	by	the	Senate	Permanent	
Subcommittee	on	Investigations	in	1990	revealed	
instances	of	fraud	and	abuse	among	trade	schools,	
lenders,	and	guarantee	agencies.	Charges	included	loan	
servicers	falsifying	documents	to	cover	up	mistakes,	
lenders	not	paying	mandated	fees	to	the	Department	of	
Education,	and	“diploma	mill”	for-profit	schools	using	
the	loan	program	to	make	money	without	providing	a	
worthwhile	degree.12	Congress	“did	not	hear	of	even	a	
single	part	of	the	guaranteed	student	loan	program	that	
is	working	efficiently	or	effectively,”	declared	committee	
Chairman	Sam	Nunn	of	Georgia.13
In	response	to	the	revelations	of	abuse	in	the	program	
and	the	high	profits	of	some	lenders,	Congress	introduced	
a	new	Federal	Direct	Lending	Program	(FDLP)	in	1992.	
The	FDLP	allowed	the	federal	government	to	make	
loans	directly	to	students	through	their	schools,	thereby	
creating	a	formidable	competitor	to	banks	and	other	
Federal	Family	Education	Loan	Program	lenders	(FFELP).	
FDLP	supporters	argued	that	by	eliminating	the	FFELP	
middlemen,	the	direct	lending	program	would	be	a	more	
efficient	lending	system	and	less	prone	to	abuse.
Figure 3. Number of Active lenders Participating in the FFEl Program, 966–2007
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Note:	Some	lenders	reported	loans	under	multiple	numbers.	In	these	instances	lenders	were	counted	more	than	once.	These	counts	do	not	include	
lenders	who	participated	exclusively	under	the	Federal	Insured	Student	Loan	Program	which	existed	from	FY68	through	FY84.
Source:	U.S.	Department	of	Education,	Office	of	Postsecondary	Education,	National	Student	Loan	Data	System.
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In	a	move	that	significantly	changed	the	role	of	
guarantee	agencies,	Congress	authorized	lenders	to	
appeal	directly	to	the	Department	of	Education	for	loan	
reimbursement,	a	step	precipitated	by	the	collapse	of	
the	Higher	Education	Assistance	Foundation	(HEAF),	
one	of	the	largest	guarantee	agencies	in	the	country.	
The	move	diminished	the	role	of	guarantee	agencies	as	
guarantors—they	were	no	longer	necessary	for	a	lender	
to	receive	reimbursement	on	a	loan,	but	did	not	change	
their	oversight	and	administrative	responsibilities	in	the	
loan	industry.	They	must	still	verify	loans,	ensure	that	
lenders	have	performed	the	required	due-diligence	on	
their	loans,	and	verify	that	lenders’	default	claims	are	
valid.
HEAF	collapsed	in	1990	due	to	high	default	rates	from	the	
large	number	of	loans	it	was	making	to	for-profit	colleges.	
To	ensure	lenders	remained	in	the	program	and	loans	
continued	to	be	available	to	students,	the	Department	of	
Education	assumed	responsibility	for	HEAF’s	loans	and,	
eventually,	for	all	defaulted	federal	loans	if	a	lender	could	
prove	a	guarantee	agency	was	insolvent.14
President	Bill	Clinton	in	1993	expanded	the	direct	lending	
program,	with	the	goal	of	making	all	federal	loans	through	
the	FDLP.	The	FDLP,	because	it	got	funds	directly	from	
the	Treasury	and	distributed	them	directly	to	students,	
eliminated	the	need	for	private	banks,	guarantee	
agencies,	and	Sallie	Mae	as	a	secondary	market.	
Clinton	also	imposed	a	fee	on	Sallie	Mae	that	essentially	
eliminated	its	funding	advantage	as	a	Government	
Sponsored	Enterprise	and	mandated	that	Sallie	Mae,	
because	it	was	a	government-chartered	entity,	act	as	a	
lender	of	last	resort	for	students	who	could	not	obtain	
loans	elsewhere.15	Sallie	Mae’s	operations	as	a	GSE	were	
primarily	limited	to	secondary	market	activities,	making	it	
difficult	for	Sallie	Mae	to	respond	to	competitive	threats	
like	the	FDLP.	In	light	of	these	changes	and	increasing	
national-level	competition	for	student	loans,	Sallie	Mae	
sought	and	won	congressional	approval	to	abandon	its	
GSE	status	and	become	a	fully	private	company,	free	to	
expand	its	business	operations	and	pursue	profits	more	
aggressively.16
Congress	passed	the	Student	Loan	Marketing	
Association	Reorganization	Act	(commonly	referred	
to	as	the	“Privatization	Act”)	in	1996.	The	law	allowed	
the	creation	of	a	holding	company—a	company	that	
owns	multiple	corporations—permitted	to	pursue	
business	opportunities	outside	the	limits	of	Sallie	Mae’s	
GSE	charter.	SLM	Holding	Corporation	became	the	
parent	company	of	both	a	GSE	entity—known	as	the	
Figure 4. Federal Student loan Program, circa 985
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“Student	Loan	Marketing	Association”—and	a	non-
GSE	corporation—Sallie	Mae.	The	GSE	was	allowed	
to	continue	serving	as	a	secondary	market	for	student	
loans,	but	was	expected	to	end	its	operations	by	2008.	
(The	GSE	entity	actually	ended	its	operations	four	years	
ahead	of	schedule,	in	late	2004.)	Meanwhile,	the	non-
GSE	arm	of	the	holding	company	could	pursue	other	
business	activities	and	build	its	operations	into	the	
company	we	now	know	as	Sallie	Mae.	After	two	decades	
of	operating	under	its	GSE	charter,	Sallie	Mae	was	free	to	
expand	its	dominance	of	the	student	loan	industry	even	
further.
Federal Student loans
There	are	three	types	of	loans	offered	through	the	federal	student	loan	program:	Stafford	loans,	which	include	subsidized	loans,	
need-based	loans	for	which	the	federal	government	pays	the	interest	during	school,	and	unsubsidized	loans,	non-need-based	loans	
for	which	the	government	does	not	pay	interest	during	school;	Parent	Loan	for	Undergraduate	Students	(PLUS)	loans,	which	allow	
parents	to	supplement	their	children’s	financial	aid;	and	GradPLUS	loans,	a	new	loan	for	graduate	students	to	supplement	Stafford	
loans.
These	loans	are	administered	through	two	programs,	the	Federal	Family	Education	Loan	Program	(FFELP)	and	the	Federal	Direct	
Loan	Program	(FDLP).
The	difference	between	the	two	programs	is	that	under	FFELP,	banks	and	other	lenders	provide	federal	loans	to	students	via	their	
college	or	university	financial	aid	offices,	while	under	FDLP,	the	federal	government	acts	as	the	lender,	with	the	U.S.	Department	
of	Education	making	loans	to	students	through	their	campus	aid	offices.	Seventy-seven	percent	of	federal	student	loans	are	made	
through	FFELP,	23	percent	through	FDLP.
While	the	interest	rates	and	terms	for	all	federal	loans	are	the	same,	the	private	FFELP	lenders	often	offer	interest-rate	reductions	for	
on-time	or	automatic	payments	that	come	directly	from	the	borrower’s	bank	account.
Students	must	complete	the	Free	Application	for	Federal	Student	Aid	(FAFSA)	in	order	to	apply	for	Stafford	and	GradPlus	loans.	The	
application	calculates	a	student’s	Expected	Family	Contribution—how	much	students	and	their	families	are	expected	to	contribute	
to	the	cost	of	college—and	a	student’s	eligibility	for	need-based	federal	financial	aid.
Loan Interest rate Limits Repayment 
Stafford Loans Fixed,	6.8	percent Undergraduate	limit:	$23,000
Combined	undergraduate	and	graduate	
limit:	$65,500
Students	may	defer	payments	while	in	school	
and	for	6	months	after	leaving	school.
The	repayment	term	is	10	years.
Subsidized	
Loans
The	government	pays	the	interest	on	these	loans	while	the	student	is	enrolled	in	school.	While	there	is	no	income	
requirement	to	receive	subsidized	loans,	students	must	demonstrate	need,	calculated	as	the	cost	of	attendance,	
minus	other	aid	and	minus	the	Expected	Family	Contribution.
Unsubsidized
Loans
The	government	does	not	pay	the	interest	on	these	loans	while	the	student	is	enrolled.	There	are	no	income	limits	
or	need	requirements	to	receive	unsubsidized	loans.
Parent Loan for 
Undergraduate 
Students 
(PLUS)
Fixed,	8.5	percent No	cumulative	limit.	
Parents	may	borrow	up	to	the	cost	of	
attendance,	minus	any	loan,	grant,	or	
work-study	aid	received.
Repayment	begins	60	days	after	funds	are	
disbursed	and	the	repayment	term	is	10	years.
There	are	no	income	or	need	requirements	to	receive	PLUS	loans.	Parents	must	submit	a	loan	application	and	pass	a	credit	check.	
Parents	with	adverse	credit	histories	may	have	their	applications	rejected,	in	which	case	the	student	is	eligible	for	increased	Stafford	
loan	limits.
GradPLUS Fixed,	8.5	percent No	cumulative	limit.	
Students	may	borrow	up	to	the	cost	of	
attendance,	minus	any	aid	received.
Students	may	defer	payments	while	in	school.	
Repayment	begins	60	days	after	funds	are	
disbursed	and	the	repayment	term	is	10	years.
There	are	no	income	or	need	requirements	to	receive	GradPLUS	loans,	but	students	must	submit	a	FAFSA	and	max-out	Stafford	
loan	limits	first.	Students,	like	parents	for	the	PLUS	loan,	can	be	denied	a	loan	if	they	have	an	adverse	credit	history,	however	they	
are	not	eligible	for	increased	Stafford	loan	amounts	if	this	happens.	Students	can	consolidate	these	loans	with	the	Stafford	loans.	
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Breaking Free
At	the	same	time	Sallie	Mae	was	breaking	free	of	its	
governmental	shackles,	two	new	lending	trends	were	
transforming	student	lending	from	primarily	a	local	and	
regional	business	to	a	national	industry,	and	making	
student	lending	a	more	competitive	marketplace	in	the	
process.
In	the	early	stages	of	the	student	loan	industry,	lenders	and	
guarantee	agencies	primarily	served	their	states.	But	as	it	
became	apparent	that	high	loan	volume	could	mean	large	
profits,	lenders	and	guarantee	agencies	moved	across	
state	lines	and	began	to	compete	on	a	national	scale.	Sallie	
Mae,	a	large,	national	company	with	a	well-known	name,	
was	in	the	perfect	position	to	profit	from	this	trend.
The	second	trend	was	the	start,	in	the	early	1990s,	of	
direct-to-consumer	loan	marketing—whereby	lenders	
went	directly	to	students	or	parents	to	sell	their	loans,	
bypassing	financial	aid	offices.	This	marked	a	significant	
shift	in	the	relationship	between	schools,	lenders,	and	
borrowers.
As	national-level	competition	and	direct-marketing	grew,	
both	students	and	schools	were	faced	with	a	variety	of	
choices	far	beyond	their	local	bank.	To	handle	this	new	
influx	of	loan	information	and	to	better	compare	and	
bargain	for	loan	deals,	schools	relied	on	“preferred-lender	
lists.”	And	the	lists	of	recommended	lenders	greatly	
influenced	students’	borrowing	decisions:	The	top	lender	
on	a	preferred-lender	list	can	garner	upward	of	95	percent	
of	a	school’s	loan	business.17	This	put	financial	aid	offices	
in	the	powerful	position	of	acting	as	gatekeepers	to	loan	
business.	For	lenders,	it	created	a	single	location	on	every	
campus	to	market	their	products.
For	Sallie	Mae,	the	“preferred-lender	list”	arrangement	has	
been	a	boon.	In	addition	to	marketing	directly	to	students,	
Sallie	Mae	has	a	400-member	campus-based	sales	
staff,	which	provides	services	to	over	6,000	colleges	and	
universities—in	essence,	nearly	every	college,	university,	
and	educational	institution	in	the	United	States.18
Direct-to-consumer	consolidation	loan	companies	
also	sprung	up	in	the	1990s.	These	companies,	taking	
advantage	of	historic	low	interest	rates,	offered	locked-
in	interest	rates	to	graduates	and	did	not	require	any	
financial	aid	office	involvement.
The	new	consolidation-only	loan	companies	threatened	to	
take	away	traditional	loan	companies’	business	entirely.	
With	the	low	interest	rates,	students	were	consolidating	
their	borrowing	at	record	levels,	even	before	they	graduated	
from	college,	meaning	that	a	company	could	lose	a	loan	
soon	after	making	it.	Family	Federal	Education	Loan	
consolidations	jumped	from	$9	billion	to	almost	$54	billion	
between	2001	and	2005.19	Originally,	traditional	lenders,	
including	Sallie	Mae,	attempted	to	hold	back	the	growth	in	
consolidation	loans	by	lobbying	for	Congress	to	implement	
regulations	that	limited	the	companies	with	which	students	
could	consolidate.	Eventually,	though,	Sallie	Mae	and	other	
private	lenders	joined	the	competition	for	consolidation	
loans,	using	their	direct-marketing	techniques	to	sell	their	
loan	consolidation	services	to	recent	graduates.
Sallie	Mae	also	has	been	an	aggressive	player	in	the	rise,	
since	the	mid-1990s,	in	private	lending—lending	outside	
of	the	federal	student	loan	program	at	market	rates	and	
without	subsidies	to	lenders	or	students.
The	early	reluctance	of	lenders	to	make	loans	to	students,	
which	led	to	the	federal	loan	program,	had	largely	
vanished	by	the	mid-1990s.	After	30	years	of	experience	
managing	federally	backed	student	loans,	banks	saw	
private	student	loans	as	a	profitable	market.	Rising	
tuitions	opened	up	demand	for	private	loans	among	
middle-	and	upper-class	families,	and	the	higher	interest	
rates	banks	could	charge	on	these	loans	made	them	more	
profitable.	As	a	result,	private	lending	to	college	students	
has	increased	by	an	average	of	27	percent	a	year	since	
2000,	from	almost	$4	billion	to	over	$16	billion	in	2006.20	
Sallie	Mae’s	private	lending	increased	from	less	than	$2	
billion	to	over	$7	billion	during	the	same	period.21
With	the	advent	of	loan-consolidation	companies,	the	
Federal	Direct	Loan	Program,	direct	marketing,	and	private	
education	lending,	the	student	loan	landscape	has	become	
extraordinarily	complex	and	lucrative,	and	increasingly	
difficult	for	regulators	to	track.	According	to	Federal	
Student	Aid,	the	U.S.	Department	of	Education	program	
that	oversees	the	federal	student	aid	programs,	the	
department	today	works	with	3,200	lenders,	35	guarantee	
agencies,	secondary	markets,	72	third-party	loan-service	
organizations,	and	with	many	other	industry	entities.22
But	it	is	Sallie	Mae	that	dominates	the	industry.	No	longer	
held	back	by	its	status	as	a	quasi-governmental	agency,	
the	company	moved	aggressively	to	establish	a	competitive	
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presence	in	every	part	of	student	lending,	largely	by	
acquiring	a	host	of	other	companies	(see	Figure	5).
Sallie	Mae’s	earliest	purchases	included	Nellie	Mae	in	
1999	and	Student	Loan	Funding	Resources	in	2000,	
both	nonprofit	student	lending	corporations.23	Nellie	Mae	
originated	over	$300	million	in	federal	loans	at	the	time	Sallie	
Mae	purchased	it,	making	it	the	17th	largest	loan	originator.	
Since	Nellie	Mae	was	a	nonprofit	organization,	Sallie	Mae	
was	required	to	compensate	the	public	for	its	market	value.24	
The	result	was	the	creation	of	the	Nellie	Mae	Foundation,	
which	had	$395	million	in	assets	after	the	acquisition.25	The	
acquisition	of	Student	Loan	Funding	Resources	received	
less	attention,	but	involved	the	purchase	of	the	eighth	largest	
holder	of	federal	student	loans.
Three	other	lender	acquisitions	expanded	Sallie	Mae’s	
geographic	reach.	In	2003,	the	company	acquired	the	
Massachusetts-based	Academic	Management	Services	
Corporation,	which	added	$1.4	billion	in	student	loans.	
In	2004,	Sallie	Mae	expanded	to	the	Southwest	with	
the	acquisition	of	nonprofit	Southwest	Student	Services	
Corporation,	a	top-30	loan	originator,	and	then	to	the	
Northwest	with	the	purchase	of	the	nonprofit	lender,	
Student	Loan	Finance	Association.
In	2000,	Sallie	Mae	purchased,	for	$770	million,	the	USA	
Group,	the	largest	guarantee	agency	in	the	country	and	
a	nonprofit	lending	conglomerate	with	services	in	loan	
origination,	enrollment	management,	loan	servicing,	and	
debt	collection.26	With	the	USA	Group	purchase,	Sallie	
Mae	went	from	“being	the	800-pound	gorilla	to	being	the	
8,000-pound	gorilla,”	in	the	student	lending	industry,	said	
Henry	B.	Howard,	president	of	U.S.	Education	Finance,	a	
private	loan	company.27
Sallie	Mae’s	purchase	of	USA	Group	did	not	include	USA	
Funds,	the	guarantee	agency	arm	of	USA	Group	and	
Figure 5. Federal Student loan Program, circa 2007, and Sallie Mae’s Presence in the Market*
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its	largest	operation.	Because	guarantee	agencies	are	
required	by	law	to	be	either	state	agencies	or	nonprofit	
agencies,	Sallie	Mae,	as	a	for-profit	company,	could	
not	own	USA	Funds.	Instead,	as	part	of	the	deal,	Sallie	
Mae	required	USA	Funds	to	contract	all	of	its	guarantee	
services	to	Sallie	Mae.	The	exclusive	relationship	gave	
Sallie	Mae	control	over	the	entire	loan	process,	allowing	
it	to	offer	schools	more	integrated	services	and	giving	it	a	
sizeable	competitive	advantage.
The	purchase	also	allowed	Sallie	Mae	to	dramatically	
expand	its	debt	collection	and	default	management	
services,	now	its	second	largest	business	segment	
behind	student	lending.	The	USA	Group	acquisition	
added	$6	billion	in	student	loans	to	Sallie	Mae’s	
portfolio	and	increased	revenue	nearly	40	percent	with	
the	new,	fee-based	services	Sallie	Mae	was	able	to	
offer.28
Since	the	USA	Group	acquisition,	Sallie	Mae	has	
purchased	four	other	debt	management	and	collection	
companies—General	Revenue	Corporation,	Pioneer	Credit	
Recovery,	Arrow	Financial	Services,	and	GRP	Financial	
Services	Corporation—which	have	expanded	its	debt	
management	operations	beyond	student	loan	collections	
into	other	types	of	consumer	debt,	including	credit	cards	
and	mortgages.	
As	a	result	of	this	shopping	spree,	Sallie	Mae	now	owns	a	
company,	or	partners	with	a	company,	in	each	of	the	critical	
areas	of	lending,	from	making	loans	to	collecting	loans.	It	
is	now	the	industry	leader	in	loan	origination,	loan	holdings,	
loan	servicing,	and	loan	collecting,	and	it	contracts	services	
to	the	largest	guarantor	in	the	country.	In	2006,	Sallie	Mae	
originated,	through	its	various	lending	brands,	nearly	$7	
billion	in	FFELP	and	PLUS	loans,	almost	80	percent	more	
than	the	next	competitor	(see	Figure	6).	The	company’s	
loans	comprised	27	percent29	of	all	federal	student	lending,	
4	percent	more	than	the	Department	of	Education’s	entire	
direct	lending	program,	and	21	percent	more	than	the	next	
largest	private	student	lender,	Citibank.30
March Toward Monopoly?
Sallie	Mae’s	dramatic	expansion	helped	fuel	extraordinary	
enthusiasm	for	the	company	by	Wall	Street	investors.	
Sallie	Mae’s	stock	has	risen	by	1,900	percent	since	1995.
But,	not	everyone	is	as	enthusiastic	as	Wall	Street	about	
Sallie	Mae’s	rapid	growth.	Industry	observers	worry	that	
if	Sallie	Mae	continues	to	expand,	it	could	eliminate	
competition	in	the	student	loan	industry	and,	most	
importantly,	the	benefits	students	see	from	competition,	
including	reduced	fees	and	discounted	interest	rates.
Figure 6. loan origination Volume Among top Student lenders, 996–2006
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“Sallie	Mae	is	on	the	march	toward	monopoly	here,”	
charged	Barmak	Nassirian,	associate	executive	director	
of	the	American	Association	of	Collegiate	Registrars	
and	Admissions	Officers,	in	a	2006	Chronicle of Higher 
Education	article	on	Sallie	Mae’s	purchase	of	state	
nonprofit	loan	agencies.31
Nassirian’s	concerns	are	illustrated	by	Sallie	Mae’s	
purchase	of	the	lending	giant	USA	Group,	which	not	
only	added	billions	in	student	loans,	but	also	allowed	
Sallie	Mae	to	expand	its	operations	into	each	point	of	the	
student	lending	cycle,	and	by	a	$1	billion	unsolicited	bid	
that	Sallie	Mae	made	in	2005	to	buy	the	Pennsylvania	
Higher	Education	Assistance	Association,	the	nation’s	
largest	nonprofit	state	loan	agency.
Yet	the	biggest	potential	for	monopoly	may	lie	in	the	
decline	of	the	Federal	Direct	Lending	Program,	Sallie	
Mae’s	biggest	competitor.	The	federal	government’s	share	
of	new	student	loans	through	its	direct	lending	program	
dropped	9	percent—from	32	percent	to	23	percent—
between	1999	and	2006,	while	Sallie	Mae’s	market	share	
has	increased	by	12	percent—from	15	percent	to	27	
percent—during	the	same	period.35
When	the	direct	lending	program	was	introduced,	it	
offered	a	number	of	benefits	to	students	not	available	
among	private	lenders:	faster,	online	loan	application	and	
processing;	reduced	loan	fees;	a	variety	of	repayment	
plans;	and	no	confusion	about	where	to	send	their	checks	
because	the	federal	government	wouldn’t	sell	their	loans.	
In	response,	private	lenders	improved	their	services,	
including	offering	more	flexible	payment	plans	and	
reduced,	or	zero,	loan	fees.
Sallie	Mae	contends	that	despite	its	expansion,	the	
student	loan	industry	remains	a	healthy,	competitive	
marketplace,	and	that	competition	has	benefited	
borrowers	through	reduced	interest	rates	for	on-time	
payments,	zero	origination	fees,	improved	services	to	
schools	and	students,	and	lower	default	rates	from	
improved	collection	practices.	The	company	also	
argues	that	its	scale	has	allowed	it	to	invest	heavily	in	
improved	technology	and	services	that	have	also	helped	
borrowers.36
Yet	the	decline	in	the	direct	lending	program’s	market	
share,	which	is	partly	due	to	Sallie	Mae’s	aggressive	
marketing	to	schools	to	switch	from	the	direct	lending	
program	to	the	private	lending	program,	may	effectively	
eliminate	Sallie	Mae’s	only	real	competitor.
Relationship Building
The	most	significant	purchase	during	Sallie	Mae’s	
expansion	was	the	company’s	acquisition	of	USA	Group	
and	the	resulting	deal	with	USA	Funds.	In	the	deal,	USA	
Funds	agreed	to	outsource	the	default-management	
and	loan-servicing	functions	on	its	then-$9	billion	loan	
portfolio	to	Sallie	Mae,	making	USA	Funds	one	of	Sallie	
Mae’s	biggest	customers.	In	2006,	32	percent	of	Sallie	
Mae’s	fee-based,	debt-management	revenue	came	from	
servicing	USA	Funds’	$27	billion	loan	portfolio.37
While	this	is	a	good	deal	for	Sallie	Mae,	it	might	not	be	a	
good	deal	for	taxpayers.	Relationships	between	lenders	
and	guarantee	agencies—like	Sallie	Mae’s	relationship	
with	USA	Funds—may	compromise	the	oversight	role	
of	guarantee	agencies	and	ultimately	hurt	students	and	
taxpayers.
Guarantee	agencies,	in	addition	to	being	the	primary	
insurer	of	federal	loans,	are	responsible	for	ensuring	that	
lenders	perform	due	diligence	on	loans—fulfill	their	legal	
obligations	to	locate	and	collect	delinquent	loans—before	
filing	a	claim	for	repayment.	This	helps	prevent	fraud	in	the	
FFEL	program	by	ensuring	that	lenders	do	not	file	false	
default-reimbursement	claims.
Title	IV	of	the	Higher	Education	Act	prohibits	guarantee	
agencies	from	contracting	with	outside	entities	to	perform	
default	aversion	or	collection	services	on	loans,	if	those	
entities	hold	or	service	the	loan.38	In	the	Sallie	Mae/USA	
Funds	arrangement,	Sallie	Mae’s	guarantor	servicing	
division	services	USA	Funds’	loans.	Because	this	division	
is	technically	separate	from	Sallie	Mae’s	lending	entities,	it	
does	not	violate	the	Title	IV	prohibition.	But	this	does	not	
eliminate	the	potential	for	conflict	of	interest.
The	U.S.	Department	of	Education	Inspector	General	
issued	a	report	in	2002	stating	that	this	exact	arrangement	
between	USA	Funds	and	Sallie	Mae	did,	in	fact,	violate	the	
Title	IV	regulation.39	But,	USA	Funds	successfully	argued	
in	2004	that	Sallie	Mae’s	guarantee	servicing	arm	and	its	
lending	arm	constituted	two	separate	entities,	and	the	U.S.	
Department	of	Education	decided	to	let	the	USA	Funds/
Sallie	Mae	arrangement	continue.	This	decision	deviates	
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from	the	findings	of	two	earlier	reports	on	relationships	
between	guarantee	agencies	and	loan	companies.
A	1993	report	by	the	Government	Accountability	Office,	
the	investigative	arm	of	Congress,	highlighted	the	problem	
of	conflicts	of	interest	between	guarantee	agencies	and	
lenders:	“An	environment	in	which	a	guaranty	agency’s	
financial	transactions	with	lenders	are	‘less	than	arms-
length’	…	may	result	in	reduced	attention	by	guaranty	
agencies	to	their	oversight	responsibilities.”40	Another	
1993	report,	from	the	U.S.	Department	of	Education	
Inspector	General,	concluded	that	“billions	of	dollars”	
of	FFELP	loans	were	at	risk	of	“mismanagement,	waste,	
and	abuse,”	because	of	guarantee	agencies’	affiliations	
with	lenders.41	Currently,	however,	only	nine	of	the	35	
guarantee	agencies	nationally	are	not	associated	with	a	
lender	or	secondary	market.42
Along	with	USA	Funds,	eight	other	guarantors	also	
contracted	with	Sallie	Mae	to	do	the	same	type	of	work	
in	2006	and	in	all,	Sallie	Mae	processed	guarantees	for	
29	percent	of	the	federally	guaranteed	student	loans	that	
year.43
Through	its	purchases	of	companies	at	each	stage	of	the	
loan	cycle,	Sallie	Mae	has	sought	to	create	a	“seamless”	
system	for	customers,	and	to	profit	from	the	fees	and	
services	at	each	point.	Sallie	Mae	has	also	used	its	
acquisitions	to	build	relationships	with	college	financial	
aid	officers	and	to	cross-promote	its	services	to	potential	
customers—more	signs	of	its	aggressive	and	successful	
business	strategies.
The	USA	Group	purchase	marked	Sallie	Mae’s	entry	
into	enrollment-management	consulting	through	the	
Special	Allowance	Payments	are	intended	to	ensure	that	
lenders	make	enough	profits	on	student	loans	to	continue	
participating	in	the	federal	loan	program.	These	payments	
make	up	a	significant	amount	of	the	program’s	administrative	
budget,	costing	the	federal	government	$4.6	billion	in	fiscal	
2007.32
Congress	is	responsible	for	establishing	the	“Special	Allowance	
Margin,”—in	effect,	the	profit—that’s	guaranteed	to	lenders.	
But,	to	reduce	program	costs,	Congress	has,	since	1986,	
gradually	reduced	the	special	allowance	margin	from	a	high	
of	3.5	percent.	Currently,	for	a	Stafford	loan	in	repayment,	the	
special	allowance	margin	is	2.3	percent.
This	“profit”	is	added	to	a	reference	interest	rate.	The	reference	
interest	rate	is	meant	to	reflect	current	market	rates,	which,	in	
turn,	reflect	the	cost	to	lenders	of	making	student	loans.	Prior	
to	2000,	this	reference	rate	was	the	90-day	Treasury	bill	rate.	
For	loans	made	after	January	2000,	the	U.S.	Department	of	
Education	uses	the	rate	for	30-day	commercial	paper.
In	the	current	formula,	the	special	allowance	margin	is	added	
to	the	cost	of	30-day	commercial	paper,	and	if	this	total	
(commercial	paper	+	special	allowance	margin)	exceeds	
the	interest	rate	paid	by	the	borrower,	the	U.S.	Department	
of	Education	pays	lenders	the	difference.	Lenders	bill	the	
Department	of	Education	quarterly	for	these	special	allowance	
payments.
The	special	allowance	margin	on	loans	has	declined	steadily	
over	the	past	10-years,	except	on	so-called	9.5	percent	loans,	
which	have	provided	a	financial	windfall	to	some	lenders.
During	the	difficult	economic	times	of	the	1980s,	the	federal	
government	allowed	nonprofit	lenders,	generally	state-
sponsored	agencies	such	as	the	Pennsylvania	Higher	
Education	Assistance	Association,	which	financed	their	loans	
with	tax-exempt	bonds,	to	collect	a	higher	rate	of	return	on	
student	loans—9.5	percent.	This	was	intended	to	encourage	
nonprofit	lenders	to	continue	making	loans	to	students	and	to	
protect	their	financial	stability.	In	1993,	when	the	economy	had	
improved,	Congress	took	away	the	special	9.5	percent	return	
for	any	new	loans—or	so	it	thought.
While	Congress	allowed	lenders	to	continue	collecting	the	
9.5	percent	margin	on	existing	loans,	a	loophole	in	the	law	
allowed	both	nonprofit	lenders	and	for-profit	lenders	who	had	
purchased	a	nonprofit	student	loan	company,	to	make	new	9.5	
percent	loans,	through	a	process	lenders	termed	“recycling.”	
By	making	new	9.5	percent	loans,	these	companies	could	
dramatically	increase	their	revenues—while	interest	rates	on	
most	loans	in	2003–04	were	around	3	percent,	banks	were	
collecting	9.5	percent	interest	on	“recycled”	loans.	The	federal	
government	made	up	the	difference,	paying	banks	a	huge	
amount	in	subsidies	and	giving	them	huge	profits—profits	that	
came	from	taxpayer	money	via	the	Department	of	Education.
A	September	2006	Inspector	General	audit	of	special	
allowance	payments	on	9.5	percent	loans	to	one	large,	for-
profit	student	loan	company,	National	Education	Loan	Network	
(Nelnet),	found	that	Nelnet	received	approximately	$278	million	
in	improper	payments	from	the	Department	of	Education.	By	
“recycling”	existing	9.5	percent	loans	in	a	program	that	Nelnet	
termed	“Project	950,”	the	company	increased	the	amount	of	
these	loans	from	$551	million	in	March	2003	to	$3.66	billion	in	
June	2004.33
In	January	2007,	Nelnet	settled	with	the	Department	of	
Education.	The	settlement	agreement	allowed	Nelnet	to	keep	
the	$278	million	in	improper	payments;	however,	it	prohibited	
future	payments	to	Nelnet	on	those	loans.	The	Department	of	
Education	also	stopped	all	future	payments	to	lenders	until	
it	could	verify	that	the	loans	were	eligible	for	the	9.5	percent	
subsidy.	To	many,	the	settlement	was	insufficient.	Declared	
Senator	Edward	Kennedy:	“The	[Bush]	administration	should	
have	settled	for	nothing	less	than	the	full	recovery	of	Nelnet’s	
ill-gotten	proceeds	from	these	loans.”	34
Special Allowances and the ‘9.5 Percent loan’ Controversy
EDUCATION SECTOR REPORTS: Sallie Maewww.educationsector.org
acquisition	of	USA	Group	subsidiary	Noel-Levitz,	the	
nation’s	largest	enrollment-management	consulting	
firm.	Enrollment	management	uses	past	enrollment	and	
financial	data	from	a	school	to	predict	which	students	are	
likely	to	apply	and	enroll,	and	how	financial	aid	awards	
can	be	leveraged	to	enroll	the	most	desirable	class	of	
students.	Noel-Levitz	has	advised	1,800	colleges	and	
universities	over	its	30-year	history,	working	with	schools	
on	marketing	campaigns,	recruiting	methods,	financial	aid	
awards,	and	student	retention	and	graduation	strategies.
This	relationship	allows	Sallie	Mae	to	consult	with	colleges	
on	their	financial	aid	strategies,	and	thus	potentially	increase	
the	amount	of	Sallie	Mae-provided	loans	the	college	offers.44	
It	is	unlikely	that	Noel-Levitz’s	consulting	services	directly	
drive	much	of	Sallie	Mae’s	lending	business.	But	it	does	
give	Sallie	Mae	an	important	relationship-building	tool.	Even	
with	increases	in	direct-to-student	marketing,	colleges	and	
universities	remain	gatekeepers	to	student	loan	business,	
and	Noel-Levitz	gives	Sallie	Mae	an	opportunity	to	build	
relationships	with	financial	aid	offices.
Sallie	Mae’s	most	recent	acquisition	has	created	another	
opportunity	for	the	company	to	cross-promote	its	
businesses.	In	2006,	Sallie	Mae	entered	into	the	business	
of	college	savings	plans.	To	encourage	college	savings,	
Congress	exempted	so-called	529	Savings	Plans	
contributions	(named	after	Section	529	of	the	federal	
tax	code)	from	federal	income	tax.	The	plans	are	state-
sponsored	investment	options	run	by	private	investment	
companies.	These	savings	plans	have	grown	rapidly	
since	the	income	tax	exemption	began	in	2001,	and,	in	
2006,	Sallie	Mae	purchased	UPromise,	one	of	the	top	529	
savings	plan	companies.
The	purchase,	which	stock	market	analysts	hailed	as	a	
coup	for	Sallie	Mae,	not	only	further	diversified	Sallie	Mae’s	
operations,	it	gave	Sallie	Mae	early	access	to	potential	
customers.45	Parents	who	open	529	savings	plans	for	their	
children	are	likely	also	parents	that	will	be	helping	their	
children	decide	which	loans	to	take	out	for	college,	and	
co-signing	private	loans.	UPromise’s	7.2	million	members	
provide	Sallie	Mae	with	many	such	potential	borrowers.
An Opportunity for Change
While	revelations	of	questionable	marketing	practices	
and	other	potential	wrongdoing	by	Sallie	Mae	and	other	
lending	industry	companies	continue	to	unfold,	Sallie	
Mae’s	recent	sale	for	$25	billion	to	a	private	investor	group	
that	includes	Bank	of	America,	J.P.	Morgan	Chase,	and	
two	private	equity	firms,	is	likely	to	reduce	public	scrutiny	
of	the	company	because	privately	held	companies	are	not	
subject	to	the	same	levels	of	public	disclosure	of	financial	
information	that	the	federal	Securities	and	Exchange	
Commission	requires	of	publicly	traded	companies.
This	puts	even	more	pressure	on	the	U.S.	Department	of	
Education	to	oversee	the	activities	of	Sallie	Mae,	as	well	
as	the	entire	student	lending	industry—something	it	has	
not	done	well	in	recent	years.	“Financial	Partners	had	not	
implemented	an	acceptable	level	of	internal	control	over	
its	monitoring	and	oversight	of	Federal	Family	Education	
Loan	program	participants,”	the	U.S.	Department	of	
Education	inspector	general	said	in	a	September	2006	
report	on	Financial	Partners,	the	arm	of	the	department’s	
Office	of	Federal	Student	Aid	responsible	for	monitoring	
guarantee	agencies,	lenders,	and	servicers.	The	
report	also	stated	that	Financial	Partners	“emphasized	
partnership	over	compliance	in	dealing	with	guarantee	
agencies,	lenders,	and	servicers.”46
Recent	news	reports	have	revealed	ties	between	the	
Department	of	Education	and	the	lending	industry	that	
may	further	compromise	the	department’s	oversight	
abilities.	The	Washington Post	has	reported,	for	example,	
that	“at	least	20	former	Sallie	Mae	employees	had	moved	
into	the	department	under	the	Bush	administration.”47	
The	student	loan	industry	also	spends	a	lot	of	money	
on	campaign	contributions	and	lobbying.	According	
to	The	New York Times,	Nelnet,	a	large	lender	found	
to	have	improperly	billed	the	Department	of	Education	
for	millions	of	dollars,	was	the	“nation’s	most	generous	
corporate	donor	to	the	National	Republican	Congressional	
Committee	in	2006.”48
The	inspector	general’s	2006	report	noted	that	high	
turnover	in	the	general	manager	position	at	Financial	
Partners	contributed	to	the	“weak	control	environment	for	
monitoring	and	oversight.”	Since	1999,	Financial	Partners	
has	seen	four	different	general	managers.	Of	these,	three	
have	come	from	the	lending	industry	(and	two	returned	to	
it	following	their	time	at	Financial	Partners)	and	one	from	
the	National	Council	of	Higher	Education	Loan	Programs,	
a	loan	industry	trade	group.	This	list	includes	the	current	
general	manager,	Matteo	Fontana,	who	worked	at	Sallie	
Mae	prior	to	taking	the	top	job	at	Financial	Partners,	and	
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who	has	recently	been	suspended	by	the	U.S.	Department	
of	Education	after	disclosure	of	his	ownership	of	stock	in	
a	student	loan	company.
When	it	launched	the	federal	student	loan	program	four	
decades	ago,	Congress	was	forced	to	offer	significant	
financial	incentives	to	banks	and	other	lenders	in	order	to	
get	them	to	participate	in	the	student	lending	program.	
Since	then,	the	program	has	grown	steadily	larger	and	
vastly	more	lucrative	for	lenders	and	other	players	in	
the	industry.	Yet	the	program	has	continued	to	favor	the	
industry	through	lending	rate	structures	and	generous,	
taxpayer-funded	financial	perks	that	all	but	guarantee	
immense	profits,	and	through	a	sympathetic	regulatory	
environment.	Not	surprisingly,	the	lending	industry	has	
recognized	these	opportunities	for	what	they	are	and	
has	moved	aggressively	to	capitalize	on	them—often	at	
significant	costs	to	students	and	taxpayers.
But	in	the	upcoming	reauthorization	of	the	Higher	
Education	Act,	Congress	has	an	opportunity	to	strike	
a	new	balance	in	student	lending,	one	that	serves	the	
interests	of	students,	taxpayers,	and	the	industry	in	more	
equal	measures.
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